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Abstract
Social media use is now commonplace across journalism, in spite of lingering unease about the impact the networked,
real-time logic of leading social media platforms may have on the quality of journalistic coverage. As a result, distinct jour-
nalistic voices are forced to compete more directly with experts, commentators, sources, and other stakeholders within
the same space. Such shifting power relations may be observed also in the interactions between political journalists and
their audiences onmajor social media platforms. This article therefore pursues a cross-national comparison of interactions
between political journalists and their audiences on Twitter in Germany and Australia, documenting how the differences
in the status of Twitter in each country’s media environment manifest in activities and network interactions. In each coun-
try, we observed Twitter interactions around the national parliamentary press corps (the Bundespressekonferenz and the
Federal Press Gallery), gathering all public tweets by and directed at the journalists’ accounts during 2017. We examine
overall activity and engagement patterns and highlight significant differences between the two national groups; and we
conduct further network analysis to examine the prevalent connections and engagement between press corps journalists
themselves, and between journalists, their audiences, and other interlocutors on Twitter. New structures of information
flows, of influence, and thus ultimately of power relations become evident in this analysis.
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1. Introduction
In spite of considerable reluctance and even hostility to-
wards social media at earlier stages, journalists have now
broadly accepted tools such as Facebook and especially
Twitter as part of their overall professional toolkit. Jour-
nalists have recognised the utility of social media espe-
cially as sources of live updates during breaking news sit-
uations (Bruno, 2011); many subjects of journalists’ sto-
ries are present on and even notorious for their usage of
social media (Ausserhofer &Maireder, 2013); journalists
have been actively encouraged to develop a social me-
dia presence by the social media ‘evangelists’ employed
by their organisations (Tenore, 2010); and at a time of
considerable industrial change and employment precar-
ity, journalists also derive career benefits from develop-
ing a strong “personal brand” independent of the news
organisation (Molyneux & Holton, 2015).
This gradual embrace of social media as platforms
for monitoring, sourcing, disseminating, and discussing
news stories also recognises broader, generational trans-
formations: as the Reuters Institute Digital News Report
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2017 shows, the use of print and broadcast news has
declined precipitously in many nations, and especially
younger audiences are now predominantly using online
and social media as their main news sources (Newman,
Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2017, p. 11).
In becomingmore active on social media, therefore, jour-
nalists are simply goingwhere their audiences and poten-
tial sources are.
But in doing so they also expose themselves to new
media logics: “with social media, journalism and audi-
ences meet on uncommon ground” (Loosen & Schmidt,
2016, p. 7). Social media platforms are general-purpose
spaces operated by third parties, rather than controlled
by news outlets in the way that masthead websites (in-
cluding the comment functionality on these sites) had
been. Journalists, sources, audiences, and other stake-
holders therefore now encounter each other in a “third
space” (Wright, Graham, & Jackson, 2016), and must
adapt to the rules of that space. But such rules are
co-evolved between platform providers and users, influ-
enced by the platforms’ communicative affordances, the
providers’ explicit governance decisions, and the user
community’s implicit conventions. This has the potential
to fundamentally affect and alter the power relations be-
tween the various participants in news and journalism.
In contrast to the gradual normalisation of previous
medial disruptions—newsprint digitalisation, 24-hour
news channels, blogging (Singer, 2005)—into standard
journalistic practice, the tendency now may thus be not
for social media to be adapted into established news pro-
duction practices and logics, but rather for news and jour-
nalism to be normalised into socialmedia, and subsumed
by socialmedia logics (Bruns, 2018). The pull of socialme-
dia as spaces where news is disseminated and discussed
may exceed the power of established journalistic prac-
tices and structures to resist this incorporation. In par-
ticular, the greater personal and interpersonal focus of
leading social media spaces may weaken the boundaries
of journalistic institutions.
Engagement through social media exposes the jour-
nalist as individual, even more than personality-driven
formats like radio and television news. Hedman (2016,
p. 11) asks, therefore, “does journalism now include not
only the content but also the journalist herself?” Some
journalists will regard this shift as liberating and empow-
ering, but it may also have unintended and negative con-
sequences: the greater public spotlight on the individ-
ual discourages journalists who are more likely to be
subjected to personal attacks on social media—including
women, as well as those representing minorities defined
by their ethnic, religious, or sexual identity—and may
perpetuate the overrepresentation of white, male, cis-
gendered staff in news organisations.
Following this increasing emphasis on the individ-
ual news practitioner, it therefore becomes necessary to
closely analyse how journalistic practices and processes
transform with the transition to social media as central
platforms. Such transformations will vary as they unfold
across different national and institutional contexts, in
diverse thematic newsbeats, and over extended time-
frames. This article addresses this challenge by observing
the posting and interaction patterns of leading political
journalists on Twitter in Germany and Australia through-
out 2017. We focus on the national parliamentary press
corps (the Bundespressekonferenz and the Federal Press
Gallery), examining all public tweets by and directed at
the journalists’ accounts.
We follow two broad analytical approaches. First, we
assess overall activity and engagement patterns for the
two press corps: we develop key metrics that evaluate
the journalists’ own usage strategies, and highlight signif-
icant differences between the two national groups. We
also assess how Twitter users approach and respond to
the content provided by press corps journalists. Second,
we conduct further network analyses to examine the
prevalent interactions between press corps journalists
themselves, and between journalists, their audiences,
and other interlocutors. In combination, the quantitative
data indicate starkly differing levels of social media take-
up between political journalists and their audiences in
Germany and Australia, as well as within the press corps
in each country, while the network analyses provide pos-
sible explanations for these patterns and point variously
to the persistence of old or emergence of new power re-
lations between interactants.
2. Political Journalism and Social Media
Political journalism has been described as “‘the most sa-
cred part’ of journalism” (Neveu, 2002, p. 23). Its pres-
tigious position as an intermediary between the people
and the political elite, generally producing highly visible
news, comes with substantial societal and democratic ex-
pectations. Especially at the national level, leading po-
litical journalists often enjoy considerable influence and
recognition both amongst the general public and in their
own profession, yet the political newsbeat is also one of
the most intensely critiqued and criticised (Albæk, van
Dalen, Jebril, & de Vreese, 2014, p. 34). Notably, such in-
fluence also extends to communicative choices: for ex-
ample, the successful use of Twitter by key political jour-
nalists during a 2009 leadership crisis in Australia led
to widespread take-up of the then still novel medium
amongst journalists and their followers, well beyond the
politics beat itself (Posetti, 2010).
But in a multimodal and hybrid environment, the in-
terconnection between journalists, politicians, and the
public has becomemore complex (Chadwick, 2013): jour-
nalists and traditional news organisations can no longer
claim a monopoly on public information, and have to
deal with political sources that have themselves become
media producers. In politics, the negotiation of mean-
ings increasingly takes place in public, and social media—
where politicians, journalists, and activists are present
andobserve each other contemporaneously—play an im-
portant role here (Ekman &Widholm, 2015). Encounters
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between political journalists and politicians during rou-
tine periods remain especially under-researched (Albæk
et al., 2014, p. 53).
While several studies examine the social media ac-
tivities of politicians or journalists in general, few stud-
ies specifically survey political journalists on this issue or
directly analyse concrete interactions between political
journalists and politicians. Dutch research suggests that
journalists on Twitter form tightly-knit networks: Vergeer
(2015, p. 283) detected a strongly connected network of
follower–followee relations between Dutch journalists;
Verweij (2012, p. 687) found a highly connected network
between Dutch politicians and political journalists. From
surveys, Rogstad (2014) showed that Norwegian political
journalists tend to use Twitter in an almost non-private
manner: although journalists engage with social media,
they exhibit differences in their self-promotion and ex-
pression of personal opinions. Similarly, using content
analysis, Nuernbergk (2016) found that German political
journalists very rarely tweeted messages of personal rel-
evance: theymainly interactedwith other journalists and
politicians via@mentions in their tweets. Further explor-
ing homophily, Hanusch and Nölleke (2018) report that
Australian journalists interact in a journalism-centred
bubble especially in their @mentions, while retweets
show slightly more diversity. Patterns of homophily ex-
ist across different beats, especially amongst sports jour-
nalists and political journalists; due to gender or geo-
graphic proximity; and also between journalists at the
same outlet.
The interactions of political journalists on Twit-
ter also reveal some of the dynamics of an agenda-
building and agenda-setting process that previously had
been considerably less public (Parmelee, 2014; Russell,
Hendricks, Choi, & Stephens, 2015). Journalists as well
as politicians, experts, activists, and other stakeholders
in policy-making processes interact to request informa-
tion, make statements, correct perceived misrepresen-
tations, or even engage in more phatic social communi-
cation. The more public nature of such exchanges can
enable journalists to force politicians into providing a
response they would not have offered in a non-public,
one-on-one context; however, the ability to make public
statements through social media has also enabled some
politicians to withdraw altogether from the more inten-
sive “negotiation-through-conversation” that is possible
in interview contexts (Broersma&Graham, 2013, p. 449).
In this article, we therefore also explore the network
structure of leading political journalists’ Twitter interac-
tions, and examine what other accounts they predomi-
nantly engage with.
We compare Australia and Germany because the two
countries differ markedly in the structure of their news
media industries, as well as in the professional and pop-
ular take-up of Twitter and other social media platforms
for news consumption, political debate, and other pur-
poses. Demographic factors may play a role here: Aus-
tralians are younger on average than Germans, and this
holds true also for the journalism industry. According to
Worlds of Journalism, German journalists (M = 46) are
nearly ten years older on average than their Australian
colleagues (M = 37) (Hanusch, 2013; Steindl, Laurerer,
& Hanitzsch, 2017). This may explain Australia’s greater
adoption of social media at least in part.
Further, the Australian news media landscape is
notoriously concentrated, with a few domestic media
companies (News Corporation, Fairfax, and the pub-
lic broadcaster ABC) dominating online marketshare
(Young, 2010). The German news market is considerably
more diverse, and features strong public service media
alongside a wide range of national and regional print
and broadcast offerings (Thomaß & Horz, 2018). Ger-
many can be considered a “Democratic Corporatist” sys-
tem because of its strong public service media, journalis-
tic professionalisation, and (still) high pressmarket reach
(Brüggemann, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro,
2014; Hallin &Mancini, 2004). Australia is amore compli-
cated case: itsmedia system is an “outrider” amongst the
Liberal group. Compared to the UK, the Australian me-
dia system is less regulated; compared to the US, it lacks
a tradition of “widespread self-regulatory professional-
ism” (Jones & Pusey, 2010, p. 465). Here, the power of
journalistic norms might be limited, and Australian jour-
nalists may be more ready to experiment with new tools
and platforms.
Perhaps as a result of their rather limited choice of
news outlets, Australians have been comparatively en-
thusiastic adopters of social media for news and other
purposes, while Germans have remained significantly
more reserved. According to the Digital News Report,
only 31% of Germans use social media as a source of
news; this compares to 52% in Australia, where social
media have overtaken print sources (Newman, Fletcher,
Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018, pp. 81, 127). Of
those who had used social media for news in the last
week, 11% of the German respondents and 18% of the
Australians were following a journalist via social media
(Hölig & Hasebrink, 2018, p. 47; Park, Fisher, Fuller, &
Lee, 2018, p. 99). These figures suggest that, on aver-
age, Australian journalists should be likely to have more
followers and receive more engagement than their Ger-
man colleagues.
We expect these differences to manifest in the uses
of Twitter by, and the audience engagement with, jour-
nalists in the respective parliamentary press corps. We
specifically chose not to examine press corps in coun-
tries such as the U.S. because journalists’ social media ac-
tivities there are already comparatively overrepresented
in the scholarly literature, even though the idiosyncratic
media and political system of the U.S. does not resem-
ble any structures found in other democratic nations
(Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2016, p. 11). Arguably, the
Australian and German contexts are more representa-
tive of a wide range of other political and media envi-
ronments, and our findings may therefore also translate
more directly to other nations.
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3. Methods and Data
This article builds on a comprehensive dataset of tweets
by and directed at these journalists during 2017. We ac-
cessed the official registers of journalists accredited to
the Australian Federal Press Gallery and German Bunde-
spressekonferenz (2016/2017 period) to retrieve an up-
to-date list of current members. We then searched Twit-
ter for the journalists’ profiles, if available, and manually
reviewed these accounts in order to ensure that we had
found the journalists’ official profiles rather than those
of namesakes, impostors, or parody accounts. For the
303 accredited Press Gallery members in Australia at the
time, we identified 189 Twitter accounts (62%); for the
825 members of the Bundespressekonferenz, we identi-
fied 461 accounts (56%). This indicates a broadly compa-
rable adoption rate amongst leading political journalists
in Australia and Germany, in spite of differences in the
size and diversity of the press corps and the general use
of Twitter and other platforms in the two countries. Of
these accounts, 115 (61%) Australian and 55 (12%) Ger-
man accounts had received official verification (the ‘blue
tick’) from Twitter; we see this as demonstrating the rel-
atively greater attention paid to their Twitter presences
by Australian press corps journalists and news outlets.
For these accounts, we used Twitter’s Application
Programming Interface (API) to retrieve their public pro-
file information, and the Twitter Capture and Analysis
Toolkit (TCAT; Borra & Rieder, 2014) to capture both
any public tweets originating from these accounts, and
any public tweets by other Twitter accounts that @men-
tioned or retweeted them. Data gathering commenced
in 2016, and continues at the time of writing.
For the present article, we selected the tweets
posted by and directed at press corps accounts in each
country during 2017.Wedo so in order to observe longer-
term patterns in tweeting activity around these journal-
ists, beyond short-term events, debates, and crises. This
does not mean that our data are unaffected by such
events, of course: inter alia, 2017 included the inaugu-
ration and subsequent actions of U.S. President Donald
Trump; continuing negotiations about the United King-
dom’s exit from the European Union; a controversial G20
summit in Hamburg (involving Trump as well as the Ger-
man and Australian leaders); continuing political leader-
ship speculation in Australia; the German federal elec-
tion on 24 September; and an Australian postal referen-
dum on the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Septem-
ber to November 2017. Such events will inevitably af-
fect social media engagement patterns around journal-
ists, but over the course of the year our data show how
journalists and their audiences use Twitter to address
a broad range of political issues during this turbulent
phase in national and international politics.
4. Findings
4.1. Activity by Journalists
Webegin our analysis with a number of descriptive statis-
tics (Table 1, Appendix). First, of the press corps accounts
we identified, 182 (96%) Australian and 400 (87%) Ger-
man accounts actively tweeted during 2017. The total
volume of tweets generated by each group is broadly
comparable, but given their different sizes this indicates
a considerably more active use of Twitter by Australian
political journalists: on average, they posted just over
four tweets per day in 2017, while German journalists
managed only 1.7 tweets. However, in each country a
smaller group of particularly enthusiastic adopters is re-
sponsible for much of this tweeting: in Germany, the top
decile of the 40 most active accounts posted some 62%
of all tweets (5.3 tweets per day); in Australia, the top
decile of 18 accounts contributed 50% of all tweets (19.7
tweets per day). The most active Australian accounts
thus provide a steady running commentary about politi-
cal events, while their German counterparts remain con-
siderably more restrained.
Australian press corps journalists have also attracted
far more followers. Unsurprisingly, however, the median
figures indicate that such attention is again very unevenly
distributed: a handful of journalists command far greater
audiences than their colleagues. In each country, the
most active tweeters also attract larger numbers of fol-
lowers; however, activity levels are not the only or even
the main criterion as Twitter users choose which polit-
ical journalists to follow: the most followed journalists
in Australia and Germany account for only 29% or 39%
of all tweets, respectively, but have considerably larger
audiences on Twitter than their more active colleagues.
This discrepancy may be partly explained by personal or
institutional brand recognition.
Across the entire press corps, in both countries, the
median number of followees for journalists’ accounts is
roughly half the median number of followers; overall,
this wouldmean there is a one-in-two chance that a user
may be followed back by a journalist. However, these pat-
terns break down for the most active and the most fol-
lowed press gallery accounts: here, the chance of being
followed back becomes considerably more remote.
In tweets, users can @mention or retweet other ac-
counts, or make an original statement without reference
to any other participants. The tweets by Australian press
corps journalists are relatively evenly distributed across
these three tweet types (Table 2, Appendix). This does
not vary significantly for themost active accounts. In Ger-
many, however, there is a substantially greater focus on
interactive tweet types: only 23% of all tweets by Bunde-
spressekonferenz journalists are original tweets (again,
this is stable across the deciles). This may indicate a dif-
ferent understanding of the role of Twitter: while in Aus-
tralia, Twitter and other social media are now clearly es-
tablished as platforms for the dissemination of original,
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first-hand information, in Germany they may still con-
stitute secondary media for discussing and sharing the
news rather than posting genuine news updates.
Collectively, each account population @mentions
and retweets nearly 30,000 unique accounts. Again, the
top decile of German journalists is chiefly responsible
for this diversity of interlocutors. In Australia, the top
decile is slightlymore concentrated on a core of frequent
interlocutors. More generally, as Australian press corps
journalists are considerably more active overall, this also
manifests in the volume of @mentions and retweets
they post through the year: their number of such posts
per account is considerably higher.
4.2. Activity Directed at Journalists
These tweeting activities by the German and Australian
press corps are reciprocated in divergent ways by the
broader Twitter audience. In total, the Australian jour-
nalists received some 1.9 million retweets and @men-
tions from 231,496 unique accounts during 2017; Ger-
man journalists were @mentioned and retweeted only
714,206 times by 116,790 accounts (Table 3, Appendix).
In each case, roughly one quarter of these interactions
were retweets, and the remainder @mentions. Further,
48% of all Twitter accounts engaging with the German
press corps retweeted at least one of their tweets; in Aus-
tralia, only 36% of all accounts did so. Rather than sim-
ply passing on these leading political journalists’ posts,
therefore, Twitter users predominantly choose to talk to,
at, or about them; in Australia, the focus on discourse
over amplification is especially strong.
The significant variation in overall volume may have
several explanations: first, while the Australian (social
media) population is considerably smaller than the Ger-
man, the international Anglophone community is sub-
stantially larger than that of German-speakers, and Aus-
tralian journalists may therefore also have found a global
audience for their accounts. However, as national poli-
tics may not attract substantial international audiences;
it is equally possible that the significantly greater engage-
ment with Australian journalists’ accounts stems from
the fundamentally different importance of Twitter—and
social media more generally—as a source of news for
Australian users (Newman et al., 2018).
Consequently, themean andmedianmetrics per jour-
nalistic account also vary substantially. On average, a Ger-
man press corps journalist can expect some 548 retweets
and 1,411 @mentions of the course of a year; their Aus-
tralian counterpart will be retweeted 2,750 and @men-
tioned 8,348 times. Indeed, the averages for ordinaryAus-
tralian political journalists are broadly comparable with
those for themost active German press corps members.
However, in Germany 59% of all tweets from other
users are directed at the top decile of most active jour-
nalists, and 63% of mentioning users engage especially
with these leading accounts; in Australia, general user at-
tention is more broadly distributed. This may serve to
increase the diversity of public debate about domestic
politics, as the discussion involves a wider range of jour-
nalistic voices:while engagement around themost active
Australian press corps accounts is clearly very intense, it
represents less than half of all engagement with press
corps accounts.
4.3. Activity between Journalists
As noted, increased social media use in journalism may
lead to a significant reshaping of power relationships be-
tween journalists, politicians, other stakeholders, and au-
diences. Social media engagement reduces the power
of institutional authority, and places journalistic news
reporting and discussion practices at risk of being sub-
sumed into social media logics. This makes it espe-
cially important to examine whether—even within less
controllable social media environments—journalists talk
mainly amongst themselves, or allow other stakehold-
ers to enter the conversation. Where journalists engage
with each other, wemay also explore whether such inter-
actions follow institutional lines (colleague-to-colleague)
or involve other members of the press corps (indicat-
ing a domestic equivalent of the notorious ‘inside-the-
beltway’ bubble in U.S. politics).
We examine this, first, by analysing the mentions
between the press corps accounts in our study. We ac-
knowledge that the perspective this enables is neces-
sarily somewhat limited: the journalists may also inter-
act with journalists who are not themselves members of
the press corps, and thus still remain within a broader
professional ‘bubble’ rather than genuinely broadening
their discussions to include a more diverse range of par-
ticipants. Our observations of ‘insider’ conversations be-
tween press corps journalists on Twitter are therefore
likely to systematically underestimate the extent of jour-
nalists’ inward focus, but they nonetheless remain indica-
tive of broader trends.
We focus here on @mentions rather than retweets:
we expect the latter to primarily facilitate the en-
dorsement and promotion of news stories published
by the journalists’ own outlets, as well as—to an ex-
tent that varies across news organisations, as shown in
Bruns, Nuernbergk, and Schapals (2018)—by competi-
tors, while the former constitute the primary vehicle of
genuine conversation and debate on Twitter.
Of the more than 110,000 @mentions posted by
each press corps during this year, some 13,358 @men-
tions by the German journalists (12%) were directed
at fellow press corps members (Table 4, Appendix); for
Australia, that number increases to 22,296 @mentions
(22%). These percentages remain stable for the most ac-
tive and most followed top deciles amongst each press
corps. This suggests that members of the Australian
Press Gallery are twice as inwardly focussed in their
@mentioning: ‘inside-the-beltway’ tendencies amongst
this group are more prominent in Australia than they are
in Germany.
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The relatively small percentages of in-group @men-
tions also indicate that these professional bubbles re-
main highly permeable, however. Countering the myth
of a hermetically sealed “filter bubble” (Pariser, 2011),
both press corps do engage with outside accounts sub-
stantially more than they do amongst themselves; such
engagement could still be exclusive and lacking in diver-
sity if it is directed mainly at politicians and other no-
table news actors rather than at ordinary Twitter users,
of course, but on the evidence so far it does not give rise
to an entirely homophilous network that is populated
only by journalistic insiders.
In this context, it is also notable that engagement
even within the press corps themselves is comparatively
diverse: each one of the 162 Australian @mentioning
journalists also received at least one @mention dur-
ing 2017; in Germany, the 319 @mentioning journal-
ists @mentioned 331 unique press corps members. Al-
though the number of@mentions they receivedwill vary
considerably, few were left entirely unmentioned over
the course of the year, therefore.
An exhaustive categorisation of the roughly 20,000
unique accounts@mentioned by each of the press corps
during 2017 was well beyond the scope of the present
study. However, we further explored the diversity of
@mention targets in each country by examining themost
consistently @mentioned accounts. We selected those
accounts that were @mentioned by at least three dif-
ferent press corps journalists, and at least ten times in
total by those three or more journalists. This left 170
@mentioned accounts for the German press corps and
223 for their Australian colleagues (Table 5, Appendix).
Two coders sighted the profile information and recent
tweeting history for each account, and assigned an ac-
tor type1.
This exercise again revealed a somewhat greater in-
sider focus amongst Australian press corps journalists:
48% of their most frequently @mentioned accounts be-
longed to journalists inside and outside the Press Gallery,
and another 14% were institutional accounts operated
by news organisations; in Germany, 31% of the accounts
belonged to journalists, and 24% to news organisations.
This suggests a greater institutional rather than individ-
ual focus amongst German political journalists, and sup-
ports the picture of a less advanced use of social me-
dia for personal branding, and of more persistent institu-
tional loyalties, while in Australia Twitter ismore strongly
established as a public backchannel amongst the journal-
istic class, and institutional news outlets are now some-
what less prominent.
Further, German press corps accounts @mention
key political actors more actively than their Australian
counterparts; this could also be an indication of the
greater range of political interlocutors available in Ger-
many than in Australia. Other categories of Twitter ac-
counts constitute a considerably smaller subset in both
countries: while the general Twitter public direct a sub-
stantial amount of tweets at press corps members, they
only rarely become frequent and persistent conversa-
tion partners.
4.4. Network Analysis
We illustrate these patterns of interaction around press
corps accounts through the final step in our analysis: the
visualisation of the core interaction networks. Here, we
reduce the total interaction network for each country in
2017 to those directed edges with a weight of at least
10 that originate from a journalist’s account—in other
words, we focus on the journalists, and on the accounts
with which they chose to interact most consistently over
the year. This leaves 1,352 Twitter accounts (including
213 press corps accounts, or 46%) for the German Bun-
despressekonferenz, and 1,349 accounts (including 125
press corps accounts, or 66%) for the Australian Press
Gallery. Respectively, these networks contain 2,395 (Ger-
many) and 2,918 (Australia) edges; in spite of their sim-
ilar population size, therefore, the Australian network is
significantly more dense.
We use the Force Atlas 2 algorithm (Jacomy, Ven-
turini, Heymann, & Bastian, 2014) as implemented in
Gephi (Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 2009) to visualise
these networks: each Twitter account is a node in the net-
work, and each @mention an edge between two nodes.
The force-directed visualisation then produces clusters
amongst especially densely connected subsets of the net-
work, and places these at greater distance from other
nodes that are less closely connected. Further, we colour-
code the nodes (accounts) according to the news out-
let that each press corps journalist worked for, and size
them to indicate the number of @mentions received
over the course of the year. Using otherwise identical vi-
sualisation settings, the results document further struc-
tural differences between the German and Australian
press corps networks (Figures 1 and 2). In addition to
a higher network density, the Australian network also
exhibits a shorter average geodesic distance between
reachable pairs of nodes. On average, such shorter dis-
tances structurally enhance information flows.
The German network is characterised by a central
core around a collection of frequently @mentioned non-
press corps accounts including leading domestic politi-
cians, political parties, and news outlets (but @realdon-
aldtrump also features here). Most major news outlets
are represented in this network by at least one of their
journalists, and there is a tendency for journalist ac-
counts to cluster according to their employers; this in-
dicates a greater propensity to @mention in-house col-
leagues than external competitors. Some news outlets
and their most frequent interlocutors are located further
1 Possible actor types were domestic politicians/political organisations, individual journalists, news organisations, international accounts, and others
(including ordinary citizens). An intercoder reliability test by the two coders on a randomly selected sample of accounts achieved satisfactory results
(Krippendorf’s 𝛼 = 0.95, 62 decisions).
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Figure 1. Bundespressekonferenz @mention network for accounts with degree >9 (2017). Network diameter: 9 (average
geodesic distance: 4.147). Network density: 0.0012.
from the network centre: this suggests that their press
corps members engage mainly amongst themselves and
with a distinct set of conversation partners outside the
network core. Such groups include journalists from the
tabloid Bild; commercial TV station RTL and its subsidiary
n-tv; some but not all of the journalists working for pub-
lic service network ARD; and many of the journalists for
theweekly newspaper Zeit. Their subdivisions, especially
amongst ARD personnel, tend to reflect distinctions be-
tween internal units: the prime-time news team are dis-
tinct from the current affairs team, for example.2
By contrast, the Australian network shows far fewer
obvious subdivisions: although here, too, the accounts of
journalists tend to cluster by news outlet, this does not
lead to significant scissions within the overall network.
An initial assumption that the networking patterns evi-
dent here might represent the news organisations’ rela-
tive ideological positioning was also not confirmed: jour-
nalists working for RupertMurdoch’s staunchly conserva-
tiveNews Corporation outlets are surrounded by the cen-
trist public broadcaster ABC and the broadly progressive
Fairfax group. More likely, the positioning of press corps
accounts in this graph simply indicates the relative promi-
nence (at least on Twitter) of the respective news organ-
isations, with NewsCorp, Fairfax, and ABC at the centre
andmoreminor outlets (Australian Financial Review, The
Guardian, The West Australian) closer to the periphery.
This reading would again support our underlying per-
spective on the respective roles of Twitter in Australia
and Germany. Recall that the structure of these net-
2 The network density is the proportion of all possible edges (connections between nodes) that are actually present in the graph. It ranges from 0 (no
edges present) to 1 (all possible edges between all pairs of nodes present). A geodesic path, or shortest path, is a path with the minimum number of
edges between two nodes in a graph. Its length is called geodesic distance. Average distance is the average geodesic distance amongst reachable pairs.
The diameter measures the length of the largest geodesic between any pair of nodes in a graph.
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Figure 2. Press Gallery @mention network for accounts with degree >9 (2017). Network diameter: 6 (average geodesic
distance: 3.129). Network density: 0.002.
work is determined by whom the journalists themselves
choose to @mention, and how consistently. Therefore,
in Germany, where the platform—and social mediamore
generally—remain less central to the news, this active
core of the journalistic Twittersphere at the national par-
liament still focusses much more strongly on an elite
group of interlocutors surrounding the journalists, es-
pecially at their own outlets. In Australia, by contrast,
social media are now key platforms for news engage-
ment, and the network map indicates that press corps
journalists themselves also engage in somewhat broader
networks, including with highly engaged but otherwise
ordinary Twitter users. As journalists from various out-
lets engage through @mention conversations with such
ordinary users, this would serve to pull together Press
Gallery members into one network of elite political jour-
nalists that shows comparatively limited tendencies to-
wards clustering and stratification.
5. Conclusion
Cross-country comparisons that systematically investi-
gate social media engagement by journalists, and audi-
ence responses to it, over longer periods remain rare.
Our year-long comparison between Germany and Aus-
tralia examined key metrics and network structures for
such engagement, and has documented some strongly
divergent patterns of activity and engagement. It shows
that Twitter has infiltrated the field of political journalism
in Australia more comprehensively than in Germany.
There are many reasons for these developments, but
we suggest that overall patterns of media use and news
consumption in each system are particularly influential.
In Germany, forms of traditional media use still dom-
inate; additionally, the journalistic workforce is older
on average than in Australia. Other structural factors
are also likely to influence how journalists embrace and
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adapt to social media. Germany’s journalistic culture is
known to be comparatively shielded from market forces,
and has been described as “more unitary and robust to-
ward external influences” (Revers, 2017, p. 32). This may
serve to slow Germany’s adoption of new practices.
Our analysis has therefore confirmed the consider-
ably different roles that Twitter plays as a platform for
the sourcing, dissemination, and discussion of the news:
while Australian press corps journalists are substantially
more active, and also receive far more engagement
fromordinary users in return, their German counterparts
have proven considerably more reluctant to incorporate
Twitter fully into their professional workflows.
Even so, in both countries the journalists’ own con-
versational activities remain relatively elitist. On aver-
age, Australian press corps members tweet more, and
also@mention a larger number of unique accounts—yet
the range of accounts they @mention most frequently
is, if anything, even more limited. In Germany, the Bun-
despressekonferenz members’ inner circle comprises an
elite of fellow journalists, news outlets, and politicians;
journalists in the Australian Press Gallery communicate
even more strongly amongst themselves, to the compar-
ative exclusion even of political actors.
Although in both countries political journalists also in-
teract with ordinary users, these occasional interactions
appear important only in isolated cases. Future research
should analyse the content of interactions between jour-
nalists and politicians, and between journalists and ac-
tivists. Is there an “on-going discursive struggle” here
(Ekman & Widholm, 2015)? How and when do political
journalists respond to attempts by non-elite actors to
shape the news? The influence of network structures—
the extent to which relationships with journalists can be
successfully activated—deserves particular attention in
this context.
If the central core of conversations amongst political
journalists remains relatively elitist, however, it nonethe-
less does not constitute a hermetically sealed bubble im-
penetrable to outside voices: though not as extensively
as with their own peers, press corpsmembers (especially
in Australia) do also engage with a significant number of
ordinary users. This is true particularly for the most ac-
tively tweeting journalists: Press Gallery members in the
most active decile of Australian journalists sent an aver-
age of over 3,200 @mentions to nearly 1,200 unique ac-
counts during the year; their German counterparts man-
aged somewhat less than half of these averages.
We regard this as strong evidence of the gradual
but inexorable influence of social media logics on profes-
sional journalism: the more news audiences adopt social
media as news channels, the more will political journal-
ists feel obliged—out of an intrinsicmotivation to inform,
or an extrinsic need to retain readers—to serve their au-
dience through such platforms. But doing so necessarily
also means adapting to their principles and conventions:
on Twitter, engaging with others (through @mentions)
rather than merely posting original information or shar-
ing on existing news (through retweets). From our one
year of data, we are unable to assess the longitudinal dy-
namics of this potential power shift, but the comparative
analysis across the Bundespressekonferenz and Federal
Press Gallery shows that the transformation of relation-
ships between journalists and news audiences through
social media is strongly affected by domestic contexts.
Most likely there are at least twomajor forces at play.
On the one hand, the diversity and resilience of profes-
sional journalism in a given country may act as a retar-
dant of change, by enabling a conservative, risk-averse
stance for news organisations. On the other, the market
context—including especially overall social media take-
up by news audiences—may create an incentive for in-
dividual journalists and news organisations to incorpo-
rate social mediameaningfully into their newsroom prac-
tices. In Australia, therefore, we already see consider-
able advancement in the social-mediatisation of politi-
cal journalism; in Germany, journalists and news organi-
sations have so far sought to retain their power and in-
dependence to a rather greater extent. Any change to
these forces has significant implications for the shifting
power balance between political journalists and their
audiences, especially as the authority of the masthead
declines and individual journalists and news users en-
counter each other increasingly on the “uncommon
ground” (Loosen & Schmidt, 2016, p. 7) of social me-
dia platforms.
Finally, any such transformations are also likely to be
affected by the nature of the newsbeat. Leading politi-
cal correspondents are regularly presented as prominent
representatives of their news outlets, and we argue that
this prestige positions them as important rolemodels for
other journalists and the general public, able to influence
their social media use. However, the subject matter of
different newsbeats necessarily affects socialmedia prac-
tices: business journalistsmay speak to andwith a consid-
erably more exclusive in-group of experts and analysts,
while sports reporters might engage more readily with
ordinary fans. Our research therefore also points to two
key avenues for the further extension of the approach
we have employed here: first, there is considerable op-
portunity for a comparison of our results with equiva-
lent parliamentary press corps in other nations, and for
a cross-national comparison of similar well-defined jour-
nalistic corps in other specialist fields; second, there is
a need to systematically compare the social media prac-
tices of journalists across diverse newsbeats to examine
how the newsroom staff across these beats adjust to the
logic of social media in their activities. This will enable
us to further distinguish the various factors that affect
the dynamics of social media adoption and adaptation
in journalism.
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Appendix
Table 1. Overall metrics for press corps journalists (2017).
BPK (Germany)
All Top decile (most active journalists) Top decile (most followed jounalists)
Number of tweets (sum) 243,431 151,354 95,253
in % 100% 62% 39%
M Tweets 609 3,784 2,381
Md Tweets 150 1,942 975
Number of active journalists 400 40 40
M Followers 2,436 7,007 16,135
Md Followers 633 3,333 8,722
M Followees (friend count) 525 1,198 1,112
Md Followees (friend count) 328 938 944
Number of verified accounts 55 10 19
Press Gallery (Australia)
All Top decile (most active journalists) Top decile (most followed jounalists)
Number of tweets (sum) 274,201 136,826 80,797
in % 100% 50% 29%
M Tweets 1,507 7,601 4,489
Md Tweets 495 7,198 3,496
Number of active journalists 182 18 18
M Followers 13,280 39,030 84,597
Md Followers 3,483 15,597 92,835
M Followees (friend count) 1,793 4,040 2,320
Md Followees (friend count) 1,240 3,164 1,515
Number of verified accounts 115 14 17
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Table 2. Tweeting metrics for press corps journalists (2017).
Bundespressekonferenz (Germany)
All journalists Top decile (most active journalists)
Tweets Unique accounts Tweets Unique accounts
Total number of tweets (sum) 243,431 28,871 151,354 20,645
in % 100% 100% 62% 71%
Original tweets (sum) 54,891 — 29,672 —
in % 23% — 20% —
M Original tweets per sender 167 — 797 —
Md Original tweets per sender 51 — 540 —
Retweets (sum) 110,552 16,198 68,667 12,068
in % 45% 56% 45% 58%
M Retweets per sender 313 128 1,726 602
Md Retweets per sender 91 44 954 447
@mentions (sum) 112,474 20,319 70,020 14,704
in % 46% 70% 46% 71%
M@mentions per sender 292 144 1,756 695
Md@mentions per sender 60 49 958 475
Press Gallery (Australia)
All journalists Top decile (most active journalists)
Tweets Unique accounts Tweets Unique accounts
Total number of tweets (sum) 274,201 29,520 136,826 18,454
in % 100% 100% 50% 63%
Original tweets (sum) 84,659 — 44,341 —
in % 31% — 32% —
M Original tweets per sender 498 — 2,377 —
Md Original tweets per sender 147 — 1,784 —
Retweets (sum) 100,823 15,207 48,049 10,598
in % 37% 52% 35% 57%
M Retweets per sender 591 236 2,741 990
Md Retweets per sender 196 107 2,720 914
@mentions (sum) 117,091 20,702 57,386 12,601
in % 43% 70% 42% 68%
M@mentions per sender 677 310 3,232 1,187
Md@mentions per sender 222 145 3,057 1,173
Note: As single tweets can contain both retweets and @mentions, metrics for tweet types can add up to move than 100%.
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Table 3. Engagement metrics for press corps journalists (2017).
Bundespressekonferenz (Germany)
All journalists Top decile (most active journalists)
Tweets Unique accounts Tweets Unique accounts
Total mentions received 714,206 116,790 423,150 73,464
in % 100% 100% 59% 63%
Retweets received 185,648 55,837 110,875 37,218
in % 26% 48% 26% 51%
M retweets per journalist 548 335 2,742 1,447
Md retweets per journalist 74 47 1,032 683
@mentions received 548,651 86,900 327,424 53,515
in % 77% 74% 77% 73%
M@mentions per journalist 1,411 583 8,512 2,675
Md@mentions per journalist 224 141 4,072 1,757
Press Gallery (Australia)
All journalists Top decile (most active journalists)
Tweets Unique accounts Tweets Unique accounts
Total mentions received 1,904,700 231,496 920,635 92,635
in % 100% 100% 48% 40%
Retweets received 450,495 83,851 276,292 59,345
in % 24% 36% 30% 64%
M retweets per journalist 2,750 1,285 15,562 5,928
Md retweets per journalist 323 258 9,477 4,309
@mentions received 1,429,061 178,338 653,230 62,159
in % 75% 77% 71% 67%
M@mentions per journalist 8,348 2,717 36,574 8,395
Md@mentions per journalist 1,129 648 30,007 8,098
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Table 4. Interaction metrics (@mentions only) for press corps journalists (2017).
Bundespressekonferenz (Germany)
Top decile Top decile
All (most active journalists) (most followed jounalists)
Total accounts @mentioned 19,751 13,934 11,777
Other press corps members @mentioned 331 262 216
Number of @mentioning journalists 319 40 40
Total @mentions posted 112,474 70,020 48,335
Number of @mentions of other 13,358 7,882 4,778
press corps members
in % 12% 11% 10%
Press Gallery (Australia)
Top decile Top decile
All (most active journalists) (most followed jounalists)
Total accounts @mentioned 20,702 12,601 8,333
Other press corps members @mentioned 162 140 127
Number of @mentioning journalists 162 18 18
Total @mentions posted 117,091 57,836 32,454
Number of @mentions of other 26,296 12,578 6,155
press corps members
in % 22% 22% 19%
Table 5.Most @mentioned types of accounts (2017).
by Bundespressekonferenz accounts in % by Press Gallery accounts in %
Journalists (individual profiles) 52 31% 107 48%
News organisations 40 24% 31 14%
Political actors 54 32% 47 21%
International accounts 4 2% 5 2%
Other 20 12% 31 14%
Total 170 100% 223* 100%
Notes: Accounts were only considered for analysis if mentioned by at least three different journalists with weight>9 during 2017. * Two
accounts were deleted and thus not classified.
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